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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION: ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
LABOR RIGHTS OF UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS
VIA THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT

I. INTRODUCTION
The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS), formerly the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), estimates that there are
approximately seven million unauthorized immigrants living in the United
States.1 Studies have found that immigrants, both those lawfully present and
undocumented, comprise an increasingly large share of the U.S. labor force.2
At least one study has found that of the 17.9 million foreign-born workers 12.7
million are here legally, while approximately 5.2 million are working either
with expired work authorization or without work authorization altogether.3
The low-wage labor force has the highest share of undocumented workers.4 It
is widely believed that undocumented workers in the low wage sector face an
increased risk of being taken advantage of by their U.S. based employers,
either by underpayment, non-payment, or arbitrary termination from their jobs,
often through coercion and threats of deportation.5
In 2002, the Supreme Court in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB
agreed that a man named Jose Castro, who was employed at a company in
California, was unlawfully fired due to his union activities.6 The National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determined that the employee was wrongfully
terminated and recommended that the traditional remedies of back pay and

1. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ESTIMATES OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 TO 2000 1
(2001), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/publist.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2004).
2. RANDY CAPPS, MICHAEL FIX & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, URBAN INSTITUTE IMMIGRATION
STUDIES PROGRAM, A PROFILE OF THE LOW-WAGE IMMIGRANT WORKFORCE 1 (2003), at
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=310880 (last visited Apr. 18, 2004).
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. at 5 (the study finds that of the 8.6 million low-wage immigrant workers, 3.4 million,
or 40%, are undocumented and approximately 23% are naturalized citizens).
5. Sarah Cleveland, Beth Lyon & Rebecca Smith, Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Amicus Curiae Brief: The United States Violates International Law When Labor Remedies Are
Restricted on Workers’ Migrant Status, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 795, 806-09 (2003).
6. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
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reinstatement be granted.7 The company objected, claiming that the man’s
immigration status as an undocumented worker did not give him the right to
work, and thus, he was not entitled to an award of back pay or reinstatement.8
Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed that the remedy was in conflict with
federal immigration laws and therefore Mr. Castro was not entitled to the
typical remedies under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).9 Many
critics of the decision have argued that this creates an incentive for employers
to hire and abuse undocumented workers.10 Supporters have argued that the
decision settles conflicts between federal immigration and labor laws.11
This comment will explore the right of association of unauthorized
workers in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman and whether the
prohibition of back pay to undocumented workers fired for their union activity,
in contravention of United States labor laws, violates the law of nations.
Further, the possibility of using the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) as a
mechanism for undocumented workers to obtain back pay denied to them by
U.S. based employers will be explored. The following sections of this paper
will define and then set forth the key legal issues in labor, immigration, and
international law to determine whether a prohibition in awarding back pay to
unauthorized workers violates international treaty or customary law and if that
violation is actionable under the ATCA.12
II. UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS AND LABOR RIGHTS IN THE U.S.
A.

Definitions

In order to understand the distinctions made by federal immigration and
labor laws, the definitions of “employee,” “employer,” and “unauthorized
alien” must be given, along with clarification of the terms as used in this paper.
Definitions in federal labor and immigration laws tend to be concerned with
defining terms in the context of the purpose of the particular act. For instance,
the immigration regulations define “employer,” for the purpose of prohibiting
employment of an “unauthorized alien,” to mean any agent or person who

7. Id.
8. Id. at 146.
9. Id. at 151-52.
10. See Rebecca Smith and Maria Blanco, Used and Abused: The Treatment of
Undocumented Victims of Labor Law Violations Since Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 8
BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 890 (2003); see also Gabriela Robin, Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Board: A Step Backwards For All Workers in the United States, 9
NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 679, 694 (2003).
11. See generally, Timothy M. Cox, A Call to Revisit Sure-Tan v. NLRB: Undocumented
Workers and Their Right to Back Pay, 30 SW. U.L. REV. 505 (2001).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2001).
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engages the services or labor of an employee.13 The regulations further define
“employee” to mean a person who provides services or labor for an
employer.14 These definitions are circular because they reference each other
without actually defining either “employee” or “employer.” The Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) provides a specific definition of “unauthorized
alien” to mean an immigrant or alien who is not authorized by the Attorney
General as either lawfully admitted as a permanent resident or as an immigrant
or alien authorized under United States law to be employed in the United
States.15 The terms “undocumented worker” and “unauthorized workers” will
be used in this paper to refer to workers who lack the proper documentation to
be employed legally in the United States. Undocumented workers may either
be aliens who lack any legal authorization to be present in the United States or
legal aliens present in the United States, but unauthorized to work.16
Similarly, but without reference to a person’s immigration status, the
NLRA defines employee to:
include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has
not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment.17

Employer is defined only as including any person acting as an agent of the
employer.18 Under the NLRA “back pay” is a remedy received by an
employee who has been wrongfully terminated under the Act.19 An employee
discriminated against in violation of the NLRA is entitled to any damages that
result in a loss of earnings. The employee is entitled to be made whole by the

13. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(g) (2002) (The term employer means “a person or entity, including an
agent or anyone acting directly or indirectly in the interest thereof, who engages the services or
labor of an employee to be performed in the United States for wages or other remuneration. In
the case of an independent contractor or contract labor or services, the term employer shall mean
the independent contractor or contractor and not the person or entity using the contract labor.”).
14. Id. § 274a.1(f) (The term employee means “an individual who provides services or labor
for an employer for wages or other remuneration but does not mean independent
contractors . . .”).
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (“As used in this section, the term ‘unauthorized alien’ means,
with respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time, that the alien is not at that time
either (A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so
employed by this Act or by the Attorney General.”).
16. RYSZARD CHOLEWINSKI, MIGRANT WORKERS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 4-5 (1997) (describing the difference between workers who enter a country through
clandestine means and others who enter lawfully into a country but are not legally permitted to
work).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2001).
18. Id. § 152(2).
19. 1 N. PETER LAREAU, NAT’L LABOR REL. ACT: LAW & PRACTICE § 8.13(2)(a) (2003).
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employer. Remedies include, if appropriate, payment of all wages and benefits
lost, plus interest.20
B.

Right of Association and Undocumented Workers Under the NLRA

Undocumented workers have historically, and to varying degrees, been
afforded basic protections under various federal labor acts. The right to
organize is one of the areas in which the rights of undocumented workers have
been protected to some degree.21 However, these labor protections have at
times come into conflict with federal immigration policies. In 1984, the
Supreme Court in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB22 affirmed in part the National Labor
Relations Board’s (NLRB) interpretation of the NLRA on two key issues.
First, the Court found that the NLRA’s definition of “employee” included
“undocumented aliens” and extended some protection under the Act for
collective bargaining purposes.23 Secondly, the Court held that there was no
conflict between the application of the NLRA to undocumented employees and
the mandate of the INA.24 The Court in Sure-Tan reasoned that the remedy for
discriminatory discharge, which included back pay and/or reinstatement, did
not wholly turn on the employee’s legal status in the United States, although
the Court’s decision placed limitations on remedial measures based on the
employee’s immigration status.25 The Court also determined that the remedies
of back pay and reinstatement were available to immigrant workers who were
able to prove or obtain lawful entry into the United States.26
In Sure-Tan, the Court reasoned that the “task of defining the term
‘employee’ is one that ‘has been assigned primarily to the agency created by
Congress to administer the Act’” and accorded the NLRB deference to its
interpretation.27 Further, the Court found no conflict between the federal labor
and immigration laws. The Court reasoned, in part, that Congress did not at
that time make it unlawful to employ “undocumented aliens.”28 The Court
found that the purpose of the NLRA in protecting workplace conditions and
20. Id.
21. Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor
Protection and the Need for Reform, HARV. C.R.-C.L.L REV. 345, 352 (2001) (noting that the
Court’s decisions previous to the passage of the Immigration Reform Control Act (IRCA) defined
undocumented workers as employees within the definition of the NLRA). However, the author
also notes that the decision limited the remedy of back pay to those immigrant workers who were
“available” based on immigration status. Id. at 353.
22. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 892.
25. Id. at 902-05.
26. Id.
27. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891 (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111,
130 (1944)).
28. Id.
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employee rights was furthered, as protecting worker rights created a
disincentive for employers to abuse the rights of undocumented employees.29
Ultimately, the Court found a violation of the NLRA where the employer
reported the undocumented worker to immigration authorities as part of a
direct retaliation for participating in union activities.30 However, it reversed
the decision of the court of appeals to impose a minimum back pay award and
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan
specific reinstatement offers.31
foreshadowed what would become a major critique of the Court’s later
decision in Hoffman. He stated “[o]nce employers . . . realize that they may
violate the NLRA with respect to their undocumented alien employees without
fear of having to recompense those workers for lost back pay, their ‘incentive
to hire such illegal aliens’ will not decline, it will increase.”32
The 5-4 decision in Sure-Tan reflected the subsequent circuit split
regarding the eligibility of back pay for unlawful termination of undocumented
workers.33 In 2002, the Supreme Court in Hoffman revisited the issue of
remedial measures under the NLRA.34 In the interim years between the
Court’s decision in Sure-Tan and its decision in Hoffman, changes had been
made to federal immigration laws that would substantially impact how the
Court would view an undocumented worker’s entitlement to back pay under
the NLRA.
Specifically, Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA).35 The Act clearly stated that one of the central purposes of the
IRCA was to combat the employment of unlawfully present immigrants,

29. Id. at 893.
30. Id. at 891-92.
31. Id. at 906.
32. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 912 (Brennan, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting
the majority opinion, id. at 893).
33. NLRB v. A.P.R.A Fuel Oil, 134 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997) (U.S. employer who
knowingly hires undocumented workers cannot use the IRCA as a shield to avoid liability under
the NLRA); Del Rey Tortilleria v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1121 (7th Cir. 1992) (required
“employees” to show that that they are lawfully available for employment during the back pay
period); Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, 153 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 1989) (undocumented
workers employed in violation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) are subject to
risks of immigration laws); NLRB v. Felbro, 795 F.2d 705, 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
NLRB’s decision to condition Felbro’s payment of back pay upon proof of legal status in the U.S.
is inconsistent with NLRA and immigration law).
34. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 137.
35. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a (a)(2), 1324a (e)(4)(A), 1324a(f)(1), 1324c(a)(1)-(3) (1994)
(combating employment of illegal aliens made central to the policy of immigration law and
further established an employment verification system. It made it unlawful for the employer to
knowingly hire undocumented immigrant workers subjecting employers to a civil penalty and
possible criminal prosecution. It also made it a criminal offense for undocumented workers to
use false documents for the purpose of obtaining employment in the United States).
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making it illegal for employers to knowingly hire undocumented workers.36
The IRCA also made it unlawful for those immigrants to obtain and to use
false documentation in order to gain employment. Both employers and
undocumented workers were now subject to civil and criminal penalties for
violation of the Act.37 Despite the enactment of the IRCA, the NLRB
indicated that awards of back pay to undocumented workers were proper but
were unavailable “during periods when [the workers] were not lawfully
entitled to be present and employed in the United States.”38
In 2002 however, the Court in Hoffman held that allowing the NLRB to
award back pay to “illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory
prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA. It
would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration
authorities, condone prior violations of immigration laws, and encourage future
violations.”39 The Court was explicit in indicating that the NLRB still had at
its disposal other remedial measures when dealing with the NLRA, such as
cease and desist orders and notice postings.40 However, the statutory remedies
of back pay and reinstatement were found to be in conflict with federal
immigration laws. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that because immigration
laws made it impossible for undocumented workers to find employment in the
United States without contravening federal immigration law, awarding back
pay under the labor laws to “illegal aliens” would run counter to immigration
policy.41 Thus, undocumented workers are no longer entitled to back pay for
wrongful termination under the NLRA.
The decision in Hoffman was sharply split, with four Justices dissenting.
Justice Breyer, who authored the dissent, stated, “I cannot agree that the back
pay award before us, ‘runs counter to,’ or ‘trenches upon,’ national
immigration policy.”42 The dissent found, as the court did earlier in Sure-Tan,
that the enforcement of labor laws, including awarding back pay for unlawful
discharge for union activities, was congruent with the purposes of immigration
laws.43 The dissent reasoned that an order from the NLRB to grant back pay
was a reasonable deterrence to employers who seek to unlawfully deny the
right of workers to organize and also served to further immigration policy by
deterring the hiring of undocumented workers for exploitation.44 In effect, the
decision in Hoffman recognized the “illegality” of an undocumented worker’s
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. § 1324a(a).
Id.
WEST, 11 EMP. COORD. § 43.80 (2004).
Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 151.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 153-55.
Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 155.
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employment by penalizing the undocumented worker for the unlawful actions
of the employer.
The rights of undocumented workers, with respect to pay for work actually
performed, continues to be covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA),45 which sets minimum standards for working conditions in the United
States.46 The FLSA defines the term “employee”47 to include undocumented
workers who can bring an action under the Act for unpaid wages and
liquidated damages.48 However, the FLSA was not intended to regulate labor
relations, except to substitute its own minimum wage rate for any that was
substandard and an overtime rate for hours above the number it set.49 In Singh
v. Jutla, a recent case deciding whether the Hoffman analysis applies to the
FLSA, a federal district court in California declined to extend the Hoffman
analysis to state and FLSA remedial measures for undocumented workers.50 In
Singh, a man from India was awarded $200,000 in unpaid wages and damages
for retaliation.51 While the federal district court in this case declined to extend
the scope of Hoffman, other commentators predict that various federal courts
may reach an opposite result.52 What is known is that while undocumented
workers are still entitled to payment for work actually performed, back pay for
unlawful retaliatory measures under the NLRA is not allowed. Despite this
decision protecting the rights of undocumented workers under the FSLA, the
substantive federal laws protecting an undocumented worker’s right to
participate in or organize labor unions continues to be severely undercut by the
Court’s decision in Hoffman.53
III. INVOKING THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT TO PROTECT THE RIGHT TO
ORGANIZE FOR UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

Overview of the Alien Tort Claims Act

The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), enacted in 1789, provides that the
“[d]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien

45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2001).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 203(e).
48. Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 706 (11th Cir. 1988).
49. Id.
50. Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R Oil Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (2002) (though Hoffman
prevents an undocumented worker from seeking back pay, it does not preclude an undocumented
worker from seeking any form of relief, as shown through the court’s granting of both injunctive
and declaratory relief).
51. Bob Egelko, Jury Awards $200,000 to Illegal Immigrant, S. F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2003,
at A3.
52. See generally supra note 10 and accompanying text.
53. Id.
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for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”54 The ATCA creates federal jurisdiction over a tort committed
in violation of the law of nations. The ATCA has been primarily directed
toward the action of states in violation of the law of nations or treaties.55
Under the ATCA either treaty obligations, the law of nations, or customary law
may give rise to a lawsuit under the Act.56 The “law of nations” is defined by
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as: (1)
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states; (2) international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; and (3) the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations.57 In order to support a tort action of
customary international law, the norm must be “universal, definable, and
obligatory.”58 However, there is no requirement of unanimity between all
nations, but just a general recognition that the action is prohibited.59
In a seminal case extending federal court jurisdiction under the ATCA, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala ruled that an
act of torture committed by a state official against a person in detention
constituted a violation under the law of nations.60 In order to establish that
torture violated the law of nations, the court consulted the work of international
jurists, general usage, practice of nations, the United Nations Charter, United
Nations General Assembly resolutions, international treaties, and documents
expressing U.S. policy on the matter.61
Recently, the ATCA has also been used as a vehicle to litigate claims of
persons who have suffered human rights abuses committed abroad including
torture, genocide, war crimes, summary execution, arbitrary detention, and
compulsory labor claims against states and non-state actors such as

54. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2001).
55. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the ATCA
provides federal jurisdiction in a claim against a Paraguayan official by the estate of a torture and
murder victim); see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(dismissing an action brought under the ATCA by survivors of persons murdered in an attack on
a civilian bus in Israel). Congress confirmed the Second Circuit’s approach by enacting the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995) (concerning genocide, rape, and torture in the
former Yugoslavia).
56. DAVID WEISSBRODT, JOAN FITZPATRICK & FRANK NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY AND PROCESS 768 (2001).
57. Statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice, Dec. 13, 1920, art. 38, 6
L.N.T.S. 390, reprinted in ALEXANDER P. FACHIRI, THE PERMANENT COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: ITS CONSTITUTION, PROCEDURE AND WORK 355 (1932).
58. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
59. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
60. Filartiga , 630 F.2d at 876, 878.
61. Id. at 880-81.
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corporations.62 U.S. courts have construed the ATCA, in the context of human
rights, to extend to violations under the “law of nations,” including torture,
genocide, and crimes against humanity.63 For example in Kadic v. Karadzic,
the Second Circuit expanded the scope of the ATCA so that it not only applies
to state actors, but also those persons acting as private individuals.64 The court
indicated that acts such as genocide and war crimes do not require state action
to be a violation of the law of nations, although the court also cautioned that
some violations do require perpetration by a state actor.65 In fact, it has been
suggested that the relative increased use of ATCA claims against private
corporations has led U.S. courts to apply more readily apply international
human rights standards under the ATCA.66
B.

Application of the ATCA in Labor and Migrant Workers Claims

Nothing in the statute prohibits the use of the ATCA to enforce the rights
of immigrant workers and the freedom to associate.67 The ATCA may be used
as a vehicle to enforce the rights of “unauthorized workers” in the United
States, in conjunction with other remedial measures under state and federal law
have failed. Problematic prongs of the ATCA in the context of labor rights are
whether freedom of association falls within the realm of the law of nations and
whether failure to provide an adequate remedy to protect this right is
actionable under the statute.
Historically, the ATCA has been used to challenge conduct committed
outside the United States. The ATCA has also been invoked domestically by
immigrants to challenge the conditions of detention pending removal and

62. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing
dismissal of ATCA claims for torture, imprisonment, and killings allegedly performed by
Nigerian authorities at the instigation of private oil companies); In re World War II Era Japanese
Forced Labor Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that forced labor
allegations by Chinese and Korean workers stated a claim under ATCA but dismissing claims as
time-barred); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that
non-state actors may be liable for slavery and forced labor under ATCA, but granting summary
judgment for defendants on facts of the case); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,
491 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding the same, as to slave labor claims brought under ATCA against
German subsidiary of Ford Motor Co.); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (holding that Burmese pipeline workers alleging forced labor and slavery stated a
claim under ATCA).
63. Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The Comparative and
Historical Context, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 436 (2002).
64. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
65. Id. at 244.
66. Elliot Schrage, Emerging Threat: Human Rights Claims, HARV. BUS. REVIEW, Aug.
2003, at 1.
67. Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrant Workers and Domestic Enforcement of International
Labor Rights, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 529, 532-33 (2002).
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forced labor claims of aliens within the United States.68 In a case that comes
close to applying the ATCA in the domestic labor context for violations of
international labor rights, immigrant workers in Saipan initiated three class
action suits against clothing manufacturers based on the island.69 The lawsuits
were filed in 1999 and challenged unlawful factory conditions.70 Two of the
lawsuits claimed federal jurisdiction under the ATCA.71 In one of the ATCA
related cases, 30,000 foreign garment workers brought suit against nineteen
retailers and eleven Saipan-based garment contractors.72 In another ATCA
suit, immigrant workers sued in federal court in Saipan alleging, in part, that
they were drawn to Saipan with promises of jobs but were subject to
deplorable working conditions, indentured servitude, unsanitary living and
working conditions, unpaid work, and forced abortions.73
Saipan, located in the Northern Pacific Ocean, is part of a chain of islands
known as the Northern Marianas.74 More than one-half of the population on
the island consists of foreign workers.75 The island’s status as a U.S. territory
makes specific federal laws, including some labor laws, enforceable on the
island.76 Immigration law on the island is controlled by local administration

68. Papa v. I.N.S., 281 F. 3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2002) (claiming violations of the ATCA
for the killing of an immigrant while in I.N.S custody); Manliguez v. Joseph, 226 F. Supp. 2d
377, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (claim brought alleging abuse and forced labor as domestic servant);
Ashik Ahmed v. Ahm Sadiqul Hoque, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14852 at *1, *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(claim was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction, but alleged abuse and forced labor of a domestic
servant); Pushpa Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 77 (2002) (claiming violation of the ACTA for
trafficking, involuntary servitude, and false imprisonment).
69. Saipan
Sweatshop
Litigation:
An
Update
(March
11,
2002),
at
http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/marianas/update_mar02.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2004).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. First-ever Lawsuits Filed Charging Sweatshop Conspiracy Between Major U.S. Clothing
Designers and Retailers, Foreign Textile Producers, (January 13, 1999), at
http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/swatch/marianas/lawsuit.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2004)
(companies listed in the lawsuits included: The Gap; Cutter & Buck, Inc.; Target Corp.; J. Crew,
Inc.; J.C. Penny Company, Inc.; Nordstrom, Inc.; Sears Roebuck & Company; The Limited, Inc.;
OshKosh B’Gosh, Inc.; Jones Apparel Group, Inc.; Gymboree Corp.; The Associated
Merchandising Corp.; The May Department Stores Company; The Dress Barns, Inc.; Lane
Bryant, Inc.; Tommy Hilfinger USA, Inc.; Warnaco Group, Inc.; Calvin Klein, Inc.; Abercrombie
& Fitch Co.; The Talbots, Inc.; Brooks Brothers; Woolrich, Inc.; and Levi Strauss).
73. Id.
74. 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS § 23-201 (2003).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 23-204 (noting that the NLRA, FLSA (with certain exceptions), Family Medical
Leave Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans with Disabilities Act,
Occupational Safety and Health Act, Social Security Act, Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act, and the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act are applicable on the
island).
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rather than by U.S. federal immigration statutes.77 The lawsuits were
ultimately settled out of court, including a twenty million dollar award and the
establishment of an independent monitoring program to ensure compliance
with international labor and human rights standards.78 Some commentators
suggest that this case serves as an important model for U.S. federal courts to
extend their jurisdiction over transnational corporations using the ATCA.79
The case, however, may also serve as an example of how domestic courts can
apply the ATCA to enforce international labor standards, including the
freedom of association, for alien workers within the borders of the United
States.
Professor Michael Wishnie has noted that “[s]lavery, servitude, and forced
labor are now banned by numerous international instruments, and public and
private violations of the prohibitions are fully enforceable under ATCA, as the
courts to consider the question have uniformly held.”80 Wishnie and other
commentators have also noted several potential difficulties in enforcing
international labor rights under the ATCA. Sarah Cleveland noted that
“[d]espite the fact that slavery and forced labor enjoy a status akin to torture in
the international human rights lexicon, the ATCA has been largely neglected
as a means for enforcing this prohibition or any other core international labor
standard.”81
However, Virginia Leary wrote that a strong argument could be made for
the status of freedom of association and the right to organize as customary
international law, binding on all nations.82 First, she argued that while the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States does
not explicitly list freedom of association as recognized under customary
international law, its omission is not determinative of its status under the law
of nations.83 She contended that the Restatement is not an exclusive list of
rights but that the determination of whether a human rights norm has become
customary international law is based on the criteria of legal adherence and its
adoption by national and international bodies.84

77. Id. at 23-206.
78. Jenny Strasburg, Saipan Lawsuit Terms OKs: Garment Workers Get $20 Million, S. F.
CHRON., Apr. 25, 2003, at B1.
79. Jane C. Hong, Enforcement of Corporate Codes of Conduct: Finding a Private Right of
Action for International Laborers Against MNCs for Labor Right Violations, 19 WIS. INT’L L.J.
41, 61 (2000).
80. Wishnie, supra note 67, at 536.
81. Sarah Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1533, 1574 (1998).
82. VIRGINIA A. LEARY, HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 31
(1996).
83. Id. at 32.
84. Id.
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IV. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The freedom of association includes the rights to organize, to bargain
collectively, and to strike.85 In a treatise regarding the right of association,
author Sheldon Leader described the philosophical and political underpinnings
of this right:
Right to freedom of association is, in its strongest form, a bilateral liberty
indicating that one is neither under an obligation to associate or to dissociate,
and this is coupled with an immunity from any imposition of a contrary duty as
well as by a claim-right against other forms of interference either by the state,
private groups, or individuals.86

For a state to meet its international obligations of the freedom of association
requires it to take a “negative” rights approach, or the obligation of the state to
allow workers to exercise these rights free of encumbrances, and a “positive”
rights approach that includes the state’s obligation to protect these rights if
violated.87
The right to organize, or freedom of association, has been subject over
time to different interpretations amongst nations as to the extent and nature of
national protections to be afforded.88 Despite the varying governmental
policies protecting the freedom of association, this fundamental right has been
consistently defined as the right of workers to form and join trade unions for
the protection of their interests.89 The contours of the freedom of association
have been further defined in several international treaties and covenants.
A.

Treaties and Covenants

Modern international human rights law has its foundation in the United
Nations Charter and three related treaties: the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR).90 Conventions or treaties are agreements between states that
create legally binding rules for the parties. The Vienna Convention describes a
treaty as an agreement concluded between states that must be written and is

85. Lance Compa, Assessing Assessment: A Survey of Efforts to Measure Countries’
Compliance with Freedom of Association Standards, at 4 (September 30, 2002), available at
http:// www.national-acadamies.org/internationallabor.
86. SHELDON LEADER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN LABOR LAW AND
POLITICAL THEORY 15 (1992).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 4.
89. LEARY, supra note 82, at 29 (citing the 1919 ILO Constitution; 1944, ILO Declaration of
Philadelphia, ILO Convention Nos. 87 & 98, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
90. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted
in WEISSBRODT, supra note 56, at 8-9.
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governed by international law.91 The Vienna Convention also provides that
once a treaty has entered into force, it must be observed in good faith.92
Participation in treaties can range from bilateral treaties to multilateral
treaties.93
1. ICCPR & ICESCR
The United States is bound by its ratification of the ICCPR. Article 2(1) of
the Covenant ensures to “all individuals” the rights recognized in the ICCPR
without distinction of any kind.94 Currently, the ICCPR has 151 signatory
countries.95 Commentary to the ICCPR by the Human Rights Committee
states that the rights set forth in the ICCPR apply to everyone, irrespective of
reciprocity and irrespective of his or her nationality or statelessness, and must
be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens.96 Article
22(1) recognizes the right of everyone to the “association with others,
including the right to form and join trade unions.”97 However, this Article also
permits restrictions on the exercise of this right as prescribed by law to protect
national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health
or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.98 As author
Rysard Cholewinski notes, “these limitation clauses, therefore, present state
parties with the possibility of further restricting aliens’ and migrant workers’
rights: ‘Invoking these clauses, and provided such measures do not amount to
the ‘destruction of the rights at stake, governments can suspend or limit the
exercise by aliens of certain rights.”99 The Supreme Court’s decision in
Hoffman, however, does not consider the United States’ international
obligations or limitations under the Covenant.
91. Id. at 110.
92. See id. at 111.
93. Id.
94. International Convention for Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, art. 2, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], reprinted in SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 37
(David Weissbrodt, et al. eds., 2001) (“Each state party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure the all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.”).
95. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONAL HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
STATUS RATIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AS OF
NOVEMBER 2, 2003 (2003).
96. Report of the Human Rights Committee, 41 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 40, at 117-19, U.N.
Doc. A/41/40 (1986).
97. ICCPR, supra note 93, at 42.
98. Id.
99. CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 16, at 55 (quoting M. Tardou, Migrant Workers, in
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 372-73 (R. Bernhadt ed., 1981)).
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The United States is also a signatory to the ICESCR but has not ratified the
treaty.100 The treaty has 148 state signatories.101 As such, the United States is
arguably not bound by the specific provisions of the treaty. As a signatory to
the Convention, however, the United States is obliged not to defeat the object
and purpose of the treaty.102 Article 8 of the treaty obliges state parties to
undertake to ensure the right of everyone to form trade unions in order to
protect economic and social interests.103
While a treaty sets out the obligations that parties have committed
themselves to, states may, in some instances, modify their interpretation of the
treaty by entering a reservation or declaration at the time the state becomes a
party to the treaty.104 Article 2(1)(d) of the Vienna Convention defines a
reservation as a “unilateral statement . . . made by the State . . . whereby it
purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty
in application to that State.”105 However, the reservations must be compatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty in question.106 For instance, in the
case of a human rights treaty, it would not be permissible to enter a reservation
that would allow a state to continue to practice torture, as this would clearly
conflict with the purpose of the treaty.
In ratifying the ICCRP, the United States entered a declaration that the
treaty was not self-executing.107 However, some courts have held that nonself-executing treaties may still have domestic effect.108 Other courts,
however, have used the non-self-executing provision of treaties to rule that

100. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR], reprinted in SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 28
(David Weissbrodt et al. eds. 2001).
101. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONAL HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 94.
102. Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
[hereinafter Vienna Convention], reprinted in P.K. MELON, THE LAW OF TREATIES BETWEEN
STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 178 (1992).
103. ICESCR, supra note 100, at art. 8.
104. WEISSBRODT, supra note 56, at 113.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 112.
107. UNITED NATIONS, ICCPR DECLARATIONS AND RESERVATIONS, available at
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1997/documentation/reservations/ccpr.htm. (last visited Apr. 18,
2004).
108. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 594-5 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting United
States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276-77 (2d Cir. 1974)); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d
206, 231-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040 (S.D.
Fla. 2001); see also David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-SelfExecuting Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129 (1999).
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they are not judicially enforceable in United States courts.109 While federal
courts have been inconsistent in determining whether U.S. reservations make
certain human rights treaties enforceable in the courts, the United States’
obligation under international law remains intact.110 However, the failure of
courts to apply particular treaty provisions due to a reservation or failure to
ratify a treaty would not have effect, because the state may still be bound if
aspects of the treaty have become norms under customary international law.111
2. International Labor Organization Conventions
The International Labor Organization (ILO) was founded in 1919 by the
Treaty of Versailles both to regulate international labor standards and to offset
economic and competitive disadvantages incurred by states attempting to
institute fair labor practices.112 The ILO promotes human rights through the
standard setting and adoption of conventions dealing with general and specific
labor rights.113 At their essence, ILO standards are concerned with the
promotion of human rights, including fundamental freedoms and rights of
individuals.114 The ILO conventions impose binding legal obligations on states
that ratify them — to adopt national laws and practices in conformity with the
conventions.115 Trade union rights include the right to freedom of association
and collective bargaining and are fundamental tenets of the ILO.116 The
United States is bound by virtue of its ILO membership to protect the freedom
of association found in the following two conventions.117
Specifically, Article 2 of the ILO Convention No. 87 Concerning Freedom
of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize bestows workers and
employers, without distinction, the right to establish their own organizations.118
Convention 98 Article 1.1 indicates that workers shall enjoy adequate
protection against acts of anti-union discrimination with respect to their

109. See id. at 594 (citing Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 263-68 (5th Cir. 2001) (ICCPR
does not apply to the imposition of the death penalty in the United States as the treaty was nonself executing)).
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 115(b) (1986) (“That the rule of international law or a provision of an international
agreement is superseded as domestic law does not relieve the United States of its international
obligations or of the consequences of a violation of that obligation.”).
111. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-33 (1988).
112. CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 16, at 80.
113. Id. at 81.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 82.
116. Id. at 111.
117. CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 16, at 111.
118. Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize, Jul. 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17, 19.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

684

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:669

employment.119 David Montgomery has noted that “[h]ere in the United States
freedom of association has long provided an essential link between the exercise
of human rights and conditions of employment. Nineteenth-century workers
justified their collective action, before the courts and before public opinion, as
constitutionally sanctioned freedom of speech and association.”120
3. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
The freedom of association was further reinforced by the United States’
ratification of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC) in 1993.121 The NAALC was a side agreement to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Unlike other international
conventions, NAALC affirms the right of each party to establish its own labor
laws and regulations and imposed a duty to strive continually to improve labor
standards.122 But Article 2 of the Agreement also provides that each member
party must ensure that its labor laws provide for high labor standards.123
The NAALC recognizes the freedom of association.124 Specifically the
Labor Principles in Annex I of the agreement state that the parties to the
agreement commit to promote principles under each country’s domestic legal
regime including the “freedom of association and protection of the right to
organize.”125 Article 4 of the treaty further binds the United States to ensure
that parties with a legally recognized interest under its laws have access to the
courts or administrative processes to enforce a member state’s labor laws. 126
The agreement allows for remedies to ensure enforcement of labor rights
including orders, fines, penalties, imprisonment, and injunctions.127 In turn,
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman served to diminish previously
existing protections of labor rights, including the remedy of back pay to

119. Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to
Organise and to Bargain Collectively, Jul. 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257, 258.
120. David Montgomery, Labor Rights and Human Rights: A Historical Perspective, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 16 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen
F. Diamond eds., 1996).
121. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, art. 2, 32 I.L.M. 1502
[hereinafter NAALC], reprinted in 2000 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO NAFTA: A PROBLEMORIENTED COURSEBOOK 396 (2000) (affirming full respect for each Party’s constitution, and
recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or
modify accordingly it labor laws and regulations. Each Party shall ensure that its labor laws and
regulations provide for high labor standards, consistent with high quality and productivity
workplaces, and shall continue to strive to improve those standards in that light).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 395-96.
125. Id. at 395.
126. NAALC, supra note 121, at 397.
127. Id. at 398.
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undocumented workers in the United States.128 The Court’s decision in
Hoffman recognized the legal interest of undocumented immigrant workers as
“employees,” but it did not ensure proper enforcement of their rights under
domestic law.
B.

Customary International Law

Customary international law arises when a state considers itself required to
act or to refrain from acting in a specific manner. This requirement of
consistent state practice over time must stem from a sense of legal obligation
that such state acts are required by law, also known as opinio juris.129 In the
context of human rights, several customs have been recognized, including
prohibitions against genocide, torture, slavery, extra-judicial disappearance or
murder, arbitrary detention, and racial discrimination.130 While many of these
rules have been codified into treaty law, customary rules do not have to be
written down in order to prove their existence.131 One of the most important
aspects of customary international law is that it is binding on states, whether
they have consented to it or not. The only way a state may not be bound is by
consistent and express objection to the rule during its formation.132
Customary international law creates legal obligations that may bind the
United States. As early as 1784, the Supreme Court recognized that the
international law is considered to be part of the law of the United States.133
The United States generally considers customary international legal rules to be
incorporated into its domestic legal order.134 In Paquete Habana, the Supreme
Court stated:
[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations.135

Thus, customary international law is considered federal law and is supreme
over state law.136 Treaties and statutes may supersede customary international
law, however. Where a statute is ambiguous, U.S. courts will attempt to
interpret federal law so as to avoid conflict with international law, whether that
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 151.
WEISSBRODT, supra note 56, at 22.
Id. at 209-10.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 719.
Republica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111, 112 (1784).
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
Id. at 677.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-32 (1964).
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international law is in the form of a treaty or custom.137 United States courts
have recognized customary international law, including human rights norms, in
which there is a consensus in the international community that the right is
protected and where there is a shared understanding of the scope of that
protection.138 Generally, the development of customary human rights law is
established differently than other customary law, due to the historic notion that
human rights have been a matter treated between a state and its citizens.139
Support for the proposition that freedom of association has risen to the
level of customary law also stems from several sources including international
instruments that recognized the freedom of association as a fundamental right.
Several international bodies, including the ILO, have stated that “freedom of
association has become a customary rule.”140 Further evidence of opinio juris
is state adoption of domestic laws that protect the freedom of association. As
discussed above, labor laws in the United States clearly protect the right of
employees to form trade unions.141 Additionally, as demonstrated below,
several other sources can be used to demonstrate the acceptance of freedom of
association as part of customary international law.
1. National Legislation
Many countries have explicitly recognized the right to freedom of
association in the texts of their legal instruments, such as constitutions or
statutes.142 National legislation recognizing the right to association and
supporting legislation providing protection of such a right is evidence of
consistent state practice over time that stems from a sense of legal obligation.
In Europe, both national and European Union law protects the freedom of
association. For example, the right to freedom of association and assembly is

137. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 108, 109 (1804).
138. Stephens, supra note 63, at 464; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 867, 884 (2nd Cir.
1990); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 370 (E.D. La. 1997).
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 701 cmt. b (1986). Practices accepted as building customary human rights law include:
virtually universal adherence to the United Nations Charter and its human rights provisions and
virtually universal and frequently reiterated acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights even only in principle. Id.
140. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, THE TRADE UNION SITUATION IN CHILE: REPORT OF
THE FACT-FINDING AND CONCILIATION COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION ¶ 466, at
108 (1975) (finding that although Chile had not ratified the Freedom of Association and
Protection to of the Right to Organize ILO Convention No. 87, its membership to the ILO bound
it to the Convention; further noting that the freedom of association has become customary
international law).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 141 et. seq. (2004).
142. For more information see ILO Natalex database available at http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.home?p_lang=en (last viewed Apr. 18, 2004).
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recognized by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.143
The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted this right in the context
of the European Convention on Human Rights.144
Several countries protect the right to freedom of association through
constitutional provisions. Under such a legal scheme, the constitutional
recognition of the right to organize trade unions or freedom of association is
regarded as a fundamental source of labor law in that particular country. For
example in South Korea, Article 33 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the
right of workers to organize.145 This constitutional provision serves as a basis
for further labor legislation.146 Other countries recognizing a constitutional
right to the freedom of association include: Brazil,147 Canada,148 Germany,149
Japan,150 Mexico,151 Italy,152 South Africa,153 and Spain.154
Other countries, including the United States,155 do not recognize the right
to form trade unions in their constitutions, but explicitly recognize this right
under national or federal laws. For example, the United Kingdom bases this
right on various common law rules, statutory principles, and treaty ascension
so that discrimination based on, or prohibition of, a worker’s membership to a
143. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 12, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J.
(C 364) 1, in SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 28, 271 (2001).
144. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),
Sept. 3, 1953, art.11, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, reprinted in SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
245 (2001); Wilson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30668/96, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20, 523 (2002).
145. 2 INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS supra note 74, at 36-37.
146. Id.
147. BRAZ. CONST. Ch. 11 art. 8, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 13 (2002) (persons are free to form professional trade unions).
148. CAN. CONST. § 2, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 61
(1999) (everyone is entitled to freedom of association).
149. F.R.G. CONST. art. 9, para. 3, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 9 (2003) (freedom of association to improve work and economic unions for everyone).
150. JAPAN CONST. art. 28, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
17 (1990) (workers have a right to organize and bargain collectively).
151. MEX. CONST. art. 123, § XVI, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 100 (1998) (Every person has a right to form unions).
152. ITALY CONST. art. 18, 39, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 4 (2003) (Art. 18 protects citizens right to form trade associations freely, and Art. 39
states that trade union organization is free).
153. S. AFR. CONST. art. 18, 23, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 14 (2004) (Art. 18 states that everyone has freedom of association, and Art. 23 that every
worker has right to form trade unions).
154. SPAIN CONST. art. 22, 28, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 7 (2003) (Art. 22 recognizes the right of association, and Art. 28 that all persons have the
right to unionize freely).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 157, § 201 (2000).
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union is unlawful.156 Other examples of countries that recognize the freedom
of association by statute include Australia157 and Singapore.158
2. Non-Binding Resolutions and Treaties
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), passed in 1948,
delineated specific universal human rights.159 Because it was passed as a
declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations, many states
considered it a statement of principles rather than binding international law.160
In the United States, some courts have reasoned that while the UDHR is not a
treaty, it has “an effect similar to a treaty,” including the acceptance of the
UDHR as customary international law.161 The UDHR holds that everyone has
the right to peaceful assembly and association.162 The UHDR further indicates
that everyone has rights to freedom of association and to form trade unions.163
The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW) was adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1990.164 The Convention is an important
standard for the protection of the rights of non-national workers.165 The
Convention has not entered into force.166 The ICMW recognizes the principle
of equal treatment between migrant and national workers with respect to
conditions of work and terms of employment.167 The Convention also places
an obligation upon state and private parties to guarantee the rights of migrant
workers, without distinction as to their nationality or immigration status.168
While the ICMW explicitly allows states to legislate immigration laws,
including the exclusion of aliens, it does not allow unfair applicability of labor
laws to those same aliens.169 As noted above, the ICMW is not binding, and

156. 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS, supra note 74, at 7-1 to 7-56.
157. 2 INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS, supra note 74, at 34-20 to 34-21.
158. Id. at 35-12 to 35-13.
159. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR], in UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 135 (1973).
160. But see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (the UDHR is “an
authoritative statement of the international community”).
161. Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 596 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
162. UHDR, supra note 158, at art. 20.
163. Id. at art. 23, ¶ 1.
164. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, GA Res. 45/158, adopted by General Assembly, December 18, 1990,
art. 25. GA res. 45/158 [hereinafter ICMW].
165. CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 16, at 137.
166. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONAL HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 94.
167. ICMW, supra note 163, at art. 25.
168. Id. at art. 7; CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 16, at 157.
169. CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 16, at 155.
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the United States is not a signatory to the instrument. But this Convention is
persuasive evidence that the rules and norms that have been derived from other
national and international instruments, as applied to the rights of
migrant/immigrant workers, have in fact risen to the level of customary
international law.
3. Industry Codes of Conduct
Aside from the development of treaties or jurisprudence, many
international bodies and conferences have developed instruments such as
“codes of practice,” “standards,” and “resolutions.”170 These instruments are
sometimes referred to as “soft law,” as they are not legally binding.171 The
development of these rules may either signify a further codification of existing
customary law or indicate the emergence of new rules of customary law.
External voluntary codes developed by nongovernmental organizations,
private corporations, and other international actors further harmonize the
principles of workplace conduct and lend support to the contention that the
right to organize has risen to the level of customary international law. On
August 13, 2003, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights adopted the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.172
This voluntary code of conduct explicitly recognized the freedom of
association for employees in conformity with international treaties and
covenants.173 This code, like ILO conventions, places a primary obligation on
states to ensure that corporations and business entities within their jurisdictions
respect the rights of workers.174
Individual corporations and trade associations in conjunction with labor,
human rights, and religious groups have developed voluntary codes of
conduct.175 At least 240 voluntary codes of conduct addressing labor standards
170. WEISSBRODT, supra note 56, at 20.
171. Id.
172. Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of
Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, G.A. Res. 53/144, U.N. Doc. A/Res/53/144 (2003), available at http://www/umn.edu/
humanrts/intrce/Res_53_144.html (last viewed Apr. 18, 2004).
173. See generally id. at preamble, art. 9 (Transnational corporations and other business
enterprises shall ensure freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining by protecting the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization
concerned, to join organizations of their own choosing without distinction, previous
authorization, or interference, for the protection of their employment interests and for other
collective bargaining purposes as provided in national legislation and the relevant conventions of
the International Labor Organization).
174. Patrick Macklem, Labour Law Beyond Borders, 5 J. OF INT’L ECO. L. 605, 605 (2002).
175. INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS, supra note 74, at 51-5 to 51-7
(Noting that the Levi Strauss & Co. Corporate Code of Conduct was one of the first. Trade
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have been identified,176 and at least forty-two corporations worldwide make
explicit reference to the adoption of human rights standards in their own codes
of conduct.177 Some of these voluntary codes of conduct explicitly recognize
the freedoms of association and collective bargaining for workers.178 For
example, the Fair Labor Association (FLA) has promulgated rules obliging
members to comply with policies regarding child labor, discrimination, and
freedom of association.179 An example of another developed standard is the
Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000) authored by the Council on Economic
Priorities Accreditation Agency (CEPAA).
This standard encourages
companies to apply socially acceptable workplace practices in factories around
the world.180 The SA8000 uses ILO Conventions and other human rights
instruments as a basis for its rules. The code specifies minimum compliance in
the area of the rights to association and collective bargaining, among others.181
These norms are evidence and instruments of a developing custom.182 The
traditional focus on state obligations to enforce rights under domestic and
international law has seen a shift towards corporations as entities capable of
rule-making authority.183 Significant numbers of state and business entities
have, over time, acted with the intent to be legally bound by these principles,
thus giving them legal effect. While these voluntary norms would not be
considered legally binding instruments, they can be adopted as an authoritative
interpretation of the responsibilities of business under international labor and
human rights law.184 The norms serve not as an end in themselves, but as an
important step toward the development of international human rights law.
These norms can be applied toward state and non-state actors in promoting a
legally binding regime for corporate conduct.
C. Current International Legal Efforts
Current advocacy efforts have called into question the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hoffman and have asked whether it can withstand scrutiny under
international law. In two recent actions brought forth to recognize the
Association Models include the National Retail Federation Statement of Principles on Supplier
Legal Compliance and the International Council of Toy Industries (ICTI) Code of Business
Practices).
176. Id. at 51-1.
177. See generally Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, at http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Categories/Companies/Policies/Companieswithhumanrightspolicies (last visited
Apr. 18, 2004).
178. INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS, supra note 74, at 51-8.
179. Id. at 51-9.
180. Id. at 51-12.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Macklem, supra note 174, at 632.
184. WEISSBRODT, supra note 56, at 22.
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international labor rights of undocumented immigrant workers, governments
and NGOs have utilized international legal mechanisms to call into question
the Court’s decision. Currently, no decision has been made in either case.
In November 2002, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) submitted a complaint before the ILO
Freedom of Association Committee against the government of the United
States.185 The complaint alleged that the United States Supreme Court
decision in Hoffman violated the rights of undocumented workers including the
right of freedom of association, the right to organize, and the right to bargain
collectively.186 The complaint further alleged that the United States was in
breach of obligations under ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 under the 1998
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.187
Complaints may be lodged by either employers or worker rights
organizations to the International Labor Office, alleging that a member state
has failed to implement its Convention obligations.188 Matters relating to the
freedom of association are handled using a special procedure to supervise the
implementation of this principle and to assure its application.189 Under this
procedure, parties may submit a complaint to the Committee on the Freedom
of Association (CFA) regardless of whether the state has ratified Convention
No. 87 concerning the freedom of association or Convention No. 98
concerning the right to organize.190 Under the ILO procedures, a complaint
that is received and adopted would not have the effect of overturning the
Supreme Court decision. If the CFA determines that a complaint is violative
of the Conventions, it may express concern to the government, recommend
steps to remedy the situation, request a follow-up report, or initiate further
investigation into the matter.191
Additionally, in the wake of the decision in Hoffman, the Mexican
Government requested an advisory opinion from the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights.192 The request asked the Court to consider whether the United
States was in violation of its international legal obligations by limiting labor
law remedies based on immigration status.193 Several amicus curiae briefs
were also filed with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights at the request

185. AFL-CIO Complaint Filed with United Nations, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Nov. 12,
2002, at 1.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 16, at 87.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS, supra note 74, at 40-27.
192. Cleveland, supra note 5, at 796.
193. Id.
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of the government of Mexico.194 An amicus brief written on behalf of labor,
civil, and immigrant’s rights organizations in the United States claimed that the
United States was in violation of its international obligations by failing to
protect the right to freedom of association and to bargain collectively.195 The
brief argued that the unequal application of the law is a further violation of
international law because it is discrimination based on nationality.196 Further,
the brief enumerated several anecdotal harms that arose because of the Court’s
decision in Hoffman.197
V. RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY FOR IMMIGRANT WORKERS
The modern concept of human rights law has well established that
individuals are protected without regard to their status as nationals or aliens.198
Several United Nations resolutions relating to the rights of migrant/immigrant
workers also have been contemplated and adopted by the international
community.199 These resolutions and work of the special committees of the
United Nations and the International Labor Organization led to an emphasis
that existing ILO instruments should protect migrant workers no matter their
immigrant status.200 Further, as referenced above, many of the international
treaties regarding the freedom of association obligate a state to provide access
to a judicial process and an adequate remedy for violations of those rights. For
example, Article 26 of the ICCPR requires equality before the law regardless
of “national origin . . . or other status.”201 The UDHR and customary

194. Id. (briefs filed by the Government of Mexico along with several groups in the United
States).
195. Id. at 812.
196. Id. at 814.
197. Cleveland, supra note 5, at 817.
198. U.N. CHARTER, art. 55(c), reprinted in SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 14
(2001) (“The United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for and observance of human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion.”).
199. CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 16, at 139. The UN promulgated several resolutions in the
1970s regarding migrant worker rights including, GA res. 2920 (1972), reprinted in UNITED
NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 135 (1978); GA Res. 3224 (1977), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS 135 (1984); GA Res. 3449 (1975), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
135 (1984); GA Res. 31/127 (1976), in UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 366 (1984); GA Res.
32/120 (1977), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 615 (1984); GA Res. 33/163 (1978),
reprinted in UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 402 (1984).
200. CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 16, at 139-40.
201. ICCPR, supra note 94, at art. 26.
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
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international law also establishes that a right conferred in a legal regime is
entitled to an effective remedy.202
The ILO’s current policy regarding national immigration laws and
international labor rights states:
[m]embers should apply the provision of this Recommendation within the
framework of coherent policy on international migration for employment.
That policy should be based upon the economic and social needs of both
counties of origin and countries of employment; it should take account not
only of short-term manpower needs and resources but also of the long-term
social and economic consequences of migration for migrants as well for the
communities concerned.203

The ILO has noted, in a case involving the rights of undocumented workers in
Spain, that a country’s legislation involving the prohibition of foreign workers
can be justified.204 However, that same case reinforced the ILO position that
the right of a country to exclude foreigners should not impinge on the
fundamental right of association in contravention of ILO Convention No.
87.205
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman conferred a right without an
effective remedy under the NLRA.206 The Court’s decisions regarding
remedies for undocumented workers who have suffered a violation under the
NLRA only attempted to settle conflicts as they might exists between labor and
immigration laws.207 However, the Court’s construction of labor and
immigration laws did not consider the United States’ international legal
obligations with respect to both worker and immigrant rights.208 If viewed in
this context, the Court’s decision in Hoffman runs afoul of U.S. international
legal obligations. In other words, failure of an appropriate remedy for
undocumented immigrant workers who have been fired for their union
activities flouts the United States obligations under treaty and customary
international law.209
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.
Id.
202. WEISSBRODT, supra note 56, at 771-72.
203. CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 16, at 96.
204. See ILO, 327TH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, Case No.
2121 (Spain), GB.283/8, ¶ 561 (Mar. 2002).
205. Id.
206. Robin, supra note 10, at 692; Nessel, supra note 21, at 352.
207. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,
467 U.S. 883, 883 (1984).
208. Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastics Compounds,
The New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal Labor Policy, 51
UCLA L.REV. 1, 28 (2003).
209. See supra notes 201, 202 and accompanying text.
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Detractors of this position may argue that Hoffman did not strip all
remedies for undocumented workers. In fact, these workers are still afforded
the right to cease and desist orders from a court for violation of the NLRA and
to the requirement that an employer post notices of employee rights under the
Act.210 Detractors might further argue that while customary international law
may confer a right to a remedy, it does not specify the type of remedy to which
an undocumented worker is entitled. This argument, while compelling, does
not take into account principles of non-discrimination in application of the
law.211 Congress clearly set forth its mandate for a remedy of back pay for
workers fired in contravention of the NLRA. The Supreme Court’s decision to
deny the right of back pay to a worker based on his or her immigration status
violated the principle of non-discrimination.212 Further, Congress acted under
immigration law to create civil and criminal penalties for employing
undocumented workers and did not choose to preempt remedies for these same
workers under the NLRA.213 The Supreme Court in rendering its decision to
deny the remedy of back pay imposed a separate penalty on undocumented
workers not contemplated by Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is general agreement that the ATCA is an appropriate method for
protecting human rights, although litigation promoting the use of the ATCA
for labor rights is scarce. The difficulty with the position of this paper is the
recognition of a two-step violation. First, the violation of the freedom of
association involves an act on the part of a private employer. Secondly, it also
involves the failure of the state to enforce the right properly.
The proposition that the Supreme Court’s decision violates both treaty and
customary law is likely to garner much skepticism, despite the evidence
demonstrated above. Further, the call to utilize the ATCA to vindicate the
freedom of association for undocumented workers will not likely be heeded in
the near future. But, it has been suggested that the ATCA was intended to
provide a remedy “rarely provided in international law.”214 International law,
while remotely enforceable through a system of global or regional institutions,
is best enforced using national mechanisms. The enforcement of international
human rights norms plays a critical role in the implementation of international
law.215 Noted scholar Joan Fitzpatrick may have summarized the future role of
the ATCA well when she stated:

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152.
ICMW, supra note 164, at art. 7, 25; CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 16, at 156-57.
Id.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
WEISSBRODT, supra note 56, at 771.
See Stephens, supra note 63, at 450-51.
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This two-hundred-year old statute is beginning to achieve its full flowering not
only as a vehicle for vindicating the rights of victims of extreme tortious
conduct but also as an emblem of the United States’ commitment to respect the
principles of customary international law and faithful provisions of judicial
remedies for its breach, despite the cynicism, indifference, or impotence of
other states and international institutions.216

The developing and uncertain nature of ATCA litigation for violations of
human rights and labor rights makes a decision to pursue such an action in
court difficult at best. The practicalities of enforcing the right of association
and remedy for undocumented workers via the ATCA in the United States
faces considerable obstacles, only one of which is demonstrating before a court
of law that the right of association falls within the realm of the law of
nations.217 But, by taking the decision of the Court in Hoffman outside the
context of domestic labor and immigration policy and placing it squarely in the
context of international law, perhaps recognition that “illegal aliens” have
enforceable rights will serve as an alarm for employers who would otherwise
believe that these workers have no rights at all.
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